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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The state has appealed the district court's ruling that Clements's sentence
for attempted second-degree murder was illegal because it was enhanced by a
weapons enhancement. Clements has cross-appealed the district court's ruling
that his sentence for second-degree murder, also enhanced with a weapons
enhancement, was legal.
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedincis
Clements pled guilty to second-degree murder with a weapons
enhancement and attempted second-degree murder with

a weapons

enhancement, both charges reduced from first-degree, pursuant to a plea
agreement, in which the state also dismissed additional felony charges and the
parties agreed the sentences would run concurrently. (#22492 R., vol. II, pp.
238-41.) More than ten years after entry of judgment, Clements filed a motion to
correct an illegal sentence, claiming he could be legally subjected to only one
weapons enhancement.

(R.,p. 15.) The district court reopened the case, found

that the state's evidence to support the imposition of both enhancements was
insufficient, and granted the motion by vacating and re-sentencing on the
attempted murder count.
68-71.)

(R.,pp. 34-46.) The state timely appealed. (R.,pp.

ISSUES
The issue on appeal is:
Did the district court lack jurisdiction to re-examine the facts
of the underlying crimes to which Clements pled guilty over ten
years previously, to determine if Clements had a defense to one of
the enhancements?
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.)
The issue on cross-appeal has been presented as:
Did the district court err after finding that the imposition of
the two enhancements was illegal and, therefore, the sentences
were void, to invalidate only one sentence and to leave the other
sentence valid?
(Respondent's brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issue on cross-appeal as:
Is the issue on cross-appeal moot because the district court had no
jurisdiction to make factual findings on a defense that was necessarily waived by
entering a guilty plea and therefore erred in finding even one of the sentences
illegal? In the alternative, has Clements failed to show that striking down both
sentences for the two crimes he was convicted of was the proper remedy where
only one of the enhanced sentences, by definition, was even claimed to be
illegal?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Make Factual Findinqs On A Defense
That Should Have Been Asserted Prior To Enterina A Guiltv Plea
A.

Clements's Claim That The Court Had Jurisdiction To Review The
Sufficiency Of The Evidence Under Rule 35 Is Without Merit
In order to grant the Rule 35 motion the district court re-opened the ten-

year closed case, made factual findings on a statutory defense, and then
declared the enhancement of one sentence "illegal" after concluding that the
state's evidence presented at the preliminary hearing was insufficient to support
imposition of more than one enhancement. (R., pp. 34-46.) Because Rule 35
allows review of only the legal question of legality of a sentence, and did not
grant the district court authority to conduct additional fact-finding about the
underlying circumstances of the crime or the sufficiency of the state's evidence,
the district court acted beyond the scope of its jurisdiction.
ldaho Criminal Rule 35 allows for the correction of an illegal sentence, "at
any time." The question of whether a sentence is illegal under Rule 35 is a
question of law over which the appellate court employs free review. State v.
Farwell, -Idaho

,

P.3d -,

2007 WL 3052874 (Idaho, Oct. 22,2007)

("Generally, whether a sentence is illegal or whether it was imposed in an illegal
manner is a question of law, over which we exercise free review."); State v.
Harvey, 142 ldaho 727, 729, 132 P.3d 1255,1256 (Ct. App. 2006) ("the question
of whether the sentence imposed is illegal is a question of law freely reviewable
by the appellate court").

In arguing in support of the district court's actions, however, Clements
concedes that the applicability of I.C. § 19-2520E's bar against multiple
enhancements in this case is not a legal question, but is instead "a factual
question." (Respondent's brief, pp. 8-9, citing State v. Custodio, 136 ldaho 197,
207-08, 30 P.3d 975, 985-86 (Ct. App. 2001), and State v. Johns, 112 ldaho 873,
881-82, 736 P.2d 1327, 1335-36 (1987).)

He then argues that a court

addressing a Rule 35 motion claiming an illegal sentence ten years after a guilty
plea has the same duty it would have upon a challenge brought immediately after
a jury trial - review the record for sufficiency of evidence showing the two
enhanced crimes were not part of an indivisible course of conduct under I.C.

3

19-2520E. (Respondent's brief, p. 10.) By Clements's own admission, and the
cases he cites in argument, application of I.C. 3 19-2520E is a factual question,
not the legal question of whether a sentence is legal.
That the issue before the district court was a factual question, and not the
legal question of the legality of the sentence that may be brought under Rule 35,
is shown by the cases Clements relies on. In all the cases where the court held
that I.C. 3 19-2520E barred more than one enhancement the defendant went to
trial and the question of whether the evidence supported two enhancements was
based upon findings of fact adduced from the evidence presented at the trial.
See State v. Johns,
-

112 ldaho 873, 882, 736 P.2d 1327, 1336 (1987); State v.

Custodio, 136 ldaho 197, 207-08, 30 P.3d 975, 985-86 (Ct. App. 2001). In State
v. McLeskey, 138 ldaho 691, 696-97, 69 P.3d 111, 116-17 (2003), the ldaho
Supreme Court held that the district court erred in dismissing an enhancement

charge before the case went to trial. Thus, the case-law applying I.C. § 19-

2520E establishes that the bar of I.C. § 19-2520E comes into play only if the
evidence adduced at trial demonstrates that multiple enhancements are being
applied to an indivisible course of conduct.'
In the underlying case it was not improper to charge multiple
enhancements, even if the evidence ultimately would have shown a divisible
course of conduct.

McLeskey, 138 ldaho at 696-97, 69 P.3d at 116-17.

Likewise, nothing made it "illegal" for Clements to waive his chances that the
evidence at trial would demonstrate an indivisible course of conduct in order to
take advantage of a plea agreement that involved the dismissal of additional
felony charges.
The district court thus essentially made the same error as the district court
did in McLeskey, which was to dismiss an enhancement on the basis of
insufficient evidence when there had been no trial at which evidence had been
presented. The court simply had no jurisdiction to evaluate the sufficiency of the
state's evidence to support application of two enhancements after Clements pled
guilty to both.
Clements's acknowledgement

--

which was required by a review of the

applicable case-law -- that application of I.C. § 19-2520E requires factual findings

' That questions of illegality are legal ones whereas the question here presented
is a factual one is also demonstrated by review of State v. Kerriaan, 143 Idaho
185, 141 P.3d 1054 (2006). in that case Kerrigan challenged the district court's
legal authority to enhance a single sentence with two enhancements. Id.at 187,
141 P.3d at 1056. In contrast, Clements challenged whether the facts allow two
enhancements for two convictions.

demonstrates the error of the district court. Rule 35 grants jurisdiction only to
review the legal question of whether the sentence imposed was legal. Rule 35
conferred no jurisdiction on the court, after entry of a guilty plea, much less ten
years later, to evaluate the factual basis supporting the plea to, and imposition of,
two enhancements. The district court's order finding the second enhancement
illegal on the basis of insufficient evidence must therefore be vacated.

B.

Clements's Arqument That The Record Is inadequate Is Without Merit
Clements next argues that the state failed to provide an adequate

appellate record for review of its claim of error. (Respondent's brief, pp. 11-12.)
Specifically, Clements argues that the state failed to provide a transcript of the
change of plea hearing. (Id.) This argument misapprehends both the state's
argument. and the nature of appellate process.'
It is the appellant's responsibility to provide an adequate record to
substantiate his claims on appeal. State v. Mowerv, 128 ldaho 804, 805, 919
P.2d 333, 334 (1996); State v. Beason, 119 ldaho 103, 105, 803 P.2d 1009,
1011 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Murinko, I08 ldaho 872, 873, 702 P.2d 910, 911
(Ct. App. 1985). In the absence of an adequate record to support the appellant's
claims, the court will not presume error. Beason, 119 ldaho at 105, 803 P.2d at
1011; Murinko, 108 ldaho at 873, 702 P.2d at 911.
The state has presented an adequate record to substantiate its claims.
The state claims that as a matter of law a district court does not have jurisdiction

The state filed, on October 17, 2007, a motion to augment the record with this
transcript.

to re-open a final judgment and engage in a fact-finding expedition to find out
whether the state had sufficient evidence to support a second enhancement.
State v. Farwell, - Idaho

,

P.3d -,

2007 WL 3052874 (Idaho, Oct.

22, 2007) ("Generally, whether a sentence is illegal or whether it was imposed in
an illegal manner is a question of law, over which we exercise free review.");
State v. Harvey, 142 ldaho 727, 729, 132 P.3d 1255, 1256 (Ct. App. 2006) ("the
question of whether the sentence imposed is illegal is a question of law freely
reviewable by the appellate court").

The state has presented a perfectly

adequate record to support its allegations that the district court did not address a
legal question but instead delved into the factual basis for the pleas, and
therefore exceeded its jurisdiction.
Clements claims that "the change of plea transcript is presumed to support
the district court's conclusion that Mr. Clements did not waive the prohibition
against the district court imposing multiple enhancements for crimes arising out
of the same indivisible course of conduct." (Respondent's brief, p. 11.) This
claim makes no citation to the record. Review of the district court's decision
shows that this claim actually misrepresents the record. What the district court
determined was that a criminal defendant may not waive his right to challenge an
illegal sentence as a matter of law. (R., p. 42.) The presence or absence of a
transcript has no bearing on the legal question of whether a court has jurisdiction
to determine the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a charge to which the
defendant has pled guilty.

In addition, even without the transcript of the guilty plea hearing the facts
admitted by Clements are set forth in the record. He pled guilty to the charges
and counts set forth in an amended information by virtue of a plea agreement.
(#22492 R., vol. 11, pp. 238-45.) A copy of the amended information was actually
attached to the agreement as Exhibit A. (R., pp. 238, 242-43.) The facts he
admitted through his guilty plea were therefore that he shot two people on the
same date in the same county - nowhere did the state allege an indivisible
course of conduct, or even that the shootings were in the same location (other
than in the same county) or near the same time (other than on the same day).
Nowhere in that agreement did Clements reserve the right to claim that the
murder and the attempted murder were committed in the same indivisible course
of conduct, and in fact acknowledged that the written agreement was the whole
agreement of the parties.

(See#22492 R., vol. II, p. 239 (no other understanding

than contained in plea agreement).)

The record on appeal affirmatively

disproves Clements's claim that the transcript would have shown that Clements
in fact preserved his right to assert an affirmative defense against the
enhancements he was pleading guilty to; such a claim is directly contrary to the
specific terms of the plea agreement.
Because the question in this case is a legal one - whether a district court
may, after entry of plea and judgment, reopen a factual inquiry into the
sufficiency of the state's evidence to show the defendant did not commit the two
crimes in an indivisible course of conduct - lack of a transcript of the guilty plea
does not make the record incomplete.

C.

Clements's Argument That He Did Not Admit The Crimes Were Not
Committed In An Indivisible Course Of Conduct Is Without Merit
Clements next argues that because the record does not reflect that he

specifically admitted a divisible course of conduct, his sentences were illegal.
(Respondent's brief, pp. 12-14.) The state notes that the record does not reflect
that Clements admitted the murder and attempted murder were not in self
defense either. However, the defendant, as a matter of law, waives defenses to
the charges he admits through a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. State v. AlKotrani, 141 ldaho 66, 69, 106 P.3d 392, 395 (2005) (quoting Clark v. State, 92
ldaho 827, 832, 452, P.2d 54, 59 (1969)). The district court had no jurisdiction to
relieve Clements of this waiver, and determine the sufficiency of the state's
evidence, ten years after conviction.
II.
Clements's Contention That Both Of His Sentences Were llleaal Is Without Merit
Clements argues on cross-appeal that because two enhancements were
imposed, both his sentences were "void." (Respondent's brief, pp. 14-16.) He
acknowledges that his argument is contrary to existing authority. (Id. at p. 15,
citing State v. Custodio, 136 ldaho 197, 208, 30 P.3d 975, 986 (Ct. App. 2001).)
In addition, his argument ignores the very language of the statute in question:
"any person convicted of two (2) or more substantive crimes provided for in the
above code sections, which crimes arose out of the same indivisible course of
conduct, may only be subject to one (1) enhanced penalty." I.C. § 19-2520E.
Obviously one enhancement was perfectly legal; Clements's argument that they

were both somehow "void" where only one of the two enhancements was illegal
is without legal or logical merit.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's
order declaring the sentence illegal and reinstate the sentence, as enhanced, for
attempted murder.
DATED this 30 day of October
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